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! !
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FN! ! Footnote
GC I! ! Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded and 
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GC III!! Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 12 
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6
INTRODUCTION
“Your Honour, I had to do this.  If I had refused, I would have been killed 
together with the victims.  When I refused they told me: “If you´re sorry 
for them, stand up, line up  with them and we will kill you too”.  I am not 
sorry  for myself, but for my family, my wife and son, who then had (sic) 
nine months, and I could not refuse because then they would have 
killed me.”1
So spoke Drazen Erdemović at his initial appearance before the ICTY in May 1996.  This 
was the first case to come before the newly established court, and would prove to be a 
controversial starting point.  The decision of the Trial Court2  raised some important legal 
issues.  The case was appealed, and these legal issues ultimately  divided the Appeal 
Court.3   
This thesis shall concentrate on one of the central issues dealt with in the appeal, namely 
whether duress constitutes a complete defence for the killing of innocent human beings.  It 
shall focus on the majority judgement of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah.  Unlike the 
other judges in the case, they narrowed the issue down to whether duress constitutes a 
complete defence to combatants for the killing of innocent human beings.  They held that 
combatants cannot plead duress as a defence, only in mitigation. They argued that 
combatants should be expected to “exercise fortitude and a greater degree of resistance 
to a threat than civilians, at least when it is their own lives which are being threatened”4 
and that “soldiers, by the very nature of their occupation, must have envisaged the 
possibility of violent death in pursuance of the cause for which they fight.”5
This thesis examines both international humanitarian law and human rights law to 
determine whether these arguments can be supported in law.  
7
1 Erdemović Transcript, initial appearance hearing, 31 May 1996, IT-96-22-T.D241, p 9 
2 Prosecutor v Erdemović , Sentencing Judgement, Case No: IT-96-22-T, 29 November 1996
3  Prosecutor v Erdemović, Case no IT-96-22-A Judgement 7 October 1997, and Prosecutor v Erdemović, 
Case no:  IT-96-22-Tbis, Sentencing Judgment, 5 March 1998
4 Erdemović, Joint and Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, Case No IT-96-22-A, para 
84
5 Ibid
CHAPTER ONE 
THE CASE
1.1! ! THE FACTS OF THE CASE
On 16 July 1995, Drazen Erdemović was 23 years old, and a low ranking soldier in the 
Bosnian Serb  army.  That day he, and seven others in his unit, were ordered to go to a 
farm at Pilicia in eastern Bosnia.  Buses arrived containing muslim men and boys. Their 
hands were tied together, and they  were dressed in civilian clothes. They  were taken to a 
field adjacent to the farm buildings, and were lined up  before Erdemović and his fellow 
soldiers, their backs towards them.  The soldiers were ordered to shoot them.  When 
Erdemović refused, he was told by a superior officer that he could either participate in the 
execution of the men, or line up with them and be shot himself.  He faced a choice of 
being shot and adding one more to the number of those killed that day, as the men would 
be shot no matter what he did- or taking part in the firing squad. He chose to take part.  He 
estimated that he killed about seventy people that day. The quote in the introduction above 
is Erdemović´s description to the Court of his thought processes when he faced that 
choice: the thought processes of an ordinary young man, placed in an extraordinary moral 
dilemma.
Some months after the massacre, he told his story to a journalist who published it in Le 
Figaro.  In the wake of the media storm, he was arrested and sent to The Hague to appear 
before the newly formed Tribunal.  
In November 1996, Erdemović appeared before the Trial Chamber of the ICTY.  He faced 
one count of crimes against humanity, and one count of war crimes. He pled guilty  to the 
count of crimes against humanity, the more serious of the charges, under the caveat 
quoted above.  He was sentenced to ten years in prison.  
The case was appealed to the Appeals Chamber.  One of the issues the Appeals Chamber 
was required to address was whether duress could afford a complete defence to a charge 
of crimes against humanity or war crimes, such that, if the defence is proved at trial, it 
results in an acquittal of the accused. 
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1.2  ! ! THE APPEAL CHAMBER´S VERDICT
The Appeals Chamber consisted of five judges. Three of the judges answered the question 
in the negative, that duress does not constitute a complete defence to the killing of 
innocents.  The other two judges issued strong dissenting judgements.
1.2.1! ! The majority Judgement of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah
The majority  judgement was issued by Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah.  Rather than 
answering the more general question of whether duress can be a complete defence in 
international law to the killing of innocents, they concentrated on a more specific issue, 
which they formulated as follows:  in law, may duress afford a complete defence to a 
soldier charged with crimes against humanity or war crimes, where the soldier has killed 
innocent persons?6    
They looked to Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice to determine 
what sources of law they may have regard to.7 
Firstly, they considered customary  international law to ascertain whether a rule on duress 
had been formed.  They concluded, after an examination of the case law from previous 
international courts, that there was no consistent and uniform state practice, and no opinio 
juris, and that no customary rule therefore existed.8  
Secondly, they examined general principles of law recognised by civilised nations.  They 
found that the rules of the various legal systems of the world were largely inconsistent 
regarding the specific question they were addressing.9
9
6 Supra FN 4, para 32
7 Ibid, para 40
8 Ibid, para 55
9 Ibid, para 72
Having failed to find a rule, the Judges then looked to policy to try to find an answer.  This 
approach was controversial,10  and was strongly criticized by Judge Cassese in his 
dissenting opinion.11  The Judges said:
“we are concerned that, in relation to the most heinous crimes known to 
humankind, the principles of law to which we give credence have the 
appropriate normative effect upon soldiers bearing weapons of destruction and 
upon the commanders who control them in armed conflict situations.”12
They argued that one of the prime objectives of IHL is the protection of the weak and 
vulnerable, and that if national law denies recognition of duress as a defence in respect of 
the killing of innocents, the least ICL can do is match that policy, for it deals with murders 
of a far greater magnitude.13
The Judges´ view was that rather than allowing duress as a defence, it can be used in 
mitigation when it comes to sentencing by the court.  This finding was again 
controversial ,and criticized by Judge Cassese who argued that the point of criminal law is 
to punish behaviour which is criminal, and that:
“no matter how much mitigation a court allows an accused, the fundamental fact 
remains that if it convicts him, it regards his behaviour as criminal and considers 
that he should have behaved differently”.14
Judges McDonald and Vohrah rejected duress as a defence to combatants if it results in 
the killing of innocents.  Towards the end of their Judgement they explain why they have 
narrowed the issue down to whether the defence is available purely to combatants:
10
10 See Shahabudden, Mohamed, Duress in International Humanitarian Law in Barea, Barberis et al, Liber 
Amicorum In Memoriam of Judge Jose Maria Ruda, Kluver Law International 2000
11 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, para 11 and 49
12 Supra FN 4, para 75
13 Ibid
14 Supra FN 11, para 48
“we are of the view that soldiers or combatants are expected to exercise 
fortitude and a greater degree of resistance to a threat than civilians, at least 
when it is their own lives which are being threatened. Soldiers, by the very 
nature of their occupation, must have envisaged the possibility of violent death 
in pursuance of the cause for which they fight. The relevant question must 
therefore be framed in terms of what may be expected from the ordinary soldier 
in the situation of the Appellant.”15 (“paragraph 84”)
In paragraph 84, the Judges are making two claims regarding how they  expect combatants 
to behave.  Firstly, they argue that combatants are expected to “exercise fortitude and a 
greater degree of resistance to a threat than civilians, at least when it is their own lives 
which are being threatened”, in other words, that they should be braver than civilians. 
Secondly, that due to their occupation, combatants must have envisaged the possibility  of 
a violent death, and must therefore be prepared to sacrifice their own lives in a situation 
where a civilian would not be expected to do so.  The Judges did not cite any legal 
precedent for this.  
1.2.2  !! The Opinions of the other Judges
What approaches do the other three Judges take?
1.2.2.1 ! Judge Li
Judge Li was the third majority judge.16   He addressed the wider question of whether 
duress can be a complete defence to the massacre of innocent civilians.17  He considered 
national law and the customs of different states to conclude that there is a general rule that 
duress can be a complete defence, providing certain requirements are met.18  However if 
11
15 Supra, FN 4, para 84
16 Opinion of Judge Li 
17 Ibid, para 1
18 Ibid, para 5: The requirements being (a) the act was done to avoid an immediate danger both serious and 
irreparable; (b) There was no adequate means of escape; and (c) the remedy was not disproportionate to the 
evil.
the act is a heinous crime, such as the killing of innocents, it cannot be a complete 
defence, it can only be pled in mitigation.19
He also looked to policy considerations to justify his argument that there should be an 
exception in respect of the killing of innocents.  He argued that the purpose of IHL is to 
protect the innocent.20   He was uncomfortable with the prospect that, if duress was 
allowed in relation to the murder of innocents, it could be used by criminals to justify their 
actions.
Although Judge Li concurs with the majority, there is no indication in his Judgement that he 
is of the view that the decision should apply to combatants only.  He clearly envisages that 
the rule should apply to all, regardless of their background or profession.
1.2.2.2 ! Judge Cassese
Judge Cassese dissented from the majority opinion.  The question he addressed was 
whether duress can be a defense to violations of humanitarian law involving killing.21
He carried out an examination of case law to conclude that there is no consistent state 
practice in relation to the matter.  As a result, he argued, the general rule regarding duress 
must be applied, namely that it is a defence providing four criteria are met: that there is (1) 
a severe threat to life or limb; (2) no adequate means to escape the threat; (3) 
proportionality in the means taken to avoid the threat; and (4) the situation of duress 
should not be self induced.22  He stated that, in a case involving the killing of innocents, 
the third criteria of proportionality will be very difficult to meet.  The issue would be left to 
the Trial Court to decide on the facts before it.23
12
19 Ibid
20 Ibid, para 8
21 Supra FN 11, para 18
22 Ibid, para 41
23 Ibid, para 42
For Cassese, the fact that the accused is a combatant is only one of the factors to take 
into account in deciding whether the four criteria have been met.  The rank of the 
serviceman would be of utmost importance, as the lower his rank, the lower the likelihood 
of his having had any real choice.24  Other factors to consider would include whether the 
military unit to which the accused had voluntarily enlisted was purposefully intent on 
actions contrary to IHL; whether the accused knew or should have known of this when he 
enlisted; and whether the innocent victims would have been killed in any case, regardless 
of the actions taken by the accused.25
Although Cassese envisages the fact the accused is a combatant is importance when 
deciding whether or not his criteria for the defence of duress have been fulfilled, he does 
not view it as a reason to apply a different rule to combatants than that applied to civilians.
1.2.2.3 ! Judge Stephen
Judge Stephen was the second dissenting judge.26   His Judgement concentrated upon 
examining common law case law regarding duress, to conclude that the exception in 
common law withholding duress as a defence for the killing of innocents is much criticized 
in those countries.  He holds that, despite the position in many common law countries, 
there is a general principle of law allowing duress as a defence to the killing of innocents 
recognised by the world´s legal systems.27   The defence applies providing the criteria 
propounded by Judge Cassese are met.  
There is no indication in Judge Stephen´s Judgement that combatants should be treated 
differently from other members of society.  He envisages that the rules on duress should 
apply to all.
13
24 Ibid, para 45 and 51
25 Ibid, para 50
26 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Stephen 
27 Ibid, para 66
1.3! ! CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the Appeal Court´s ruling, it is only the Judgement of Judge McDonald and Judge 
Vohrah which narrows the issue to be addressed by the Court down to one of whether 
duress constitutes a defence to combatants if it results in the killing of innocents.  As their 
Judgement constitutes the majority  judgement, this distinction is significant.  However, 
their Judgement does not provide any legal justification for their assertions that soldiers 
should be braver than civilians, and more accepting of a violent death.  
 
This thesis shall examine IHL and HRL in order to establish what these areas of law 
expect of combatants - do they require a combatant to be braver than a civilian, or more 
accepting of a violent death? Can this aspect of Judges Vohrah and McDonalds´ 
Judgement be supported in international law?
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CHAPTER 2
IS THE JUDGEMENT SUPPORTED BY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW?
2.1 ! ! INTRODUCTION
IHL, also known as the law of armed conflict, or the law of war, comprises of a set of rules 
which have been formulated to limit the violence of war, with the aim of protecting those 
who are not, or who are no longer, participating in the armed conflict.  The sources of IHL 
include the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols,28  and treaties governing the 
use of weapons during an armed conflict.29   In addition, there is an increasing body of 
customary international law.30  
The law which applies in an armed conflict varies according to whether the conflict is 
international, or is confined within the borders of a State.  In order to determine what rights 
a combatant has, and what standards he must adhere to under IHL, it is therefore 
necessary to examine, in turn, the law which applies in an IAC and in a NIAC.
2.2! ! INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS
2.2.1! ! The Status of Combatants in IHL as Compared to that of Civilians
IHL divides those involved in an armed conflict into three different groups:  combatants,31 
civilians,32 and civilians taking a direct part in hostilities.33  Each group  has different rights 
and protections.
15
28GC I; GC II; GC III; GC IV, AP I; AP II; and AP III: Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 12 August 
1949, and relating to the Adoption of a Additional Distinctive Emblem, adopted on 8 December 2005 
29  For example:  Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects as amended on 20 
December 2001; Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction 13 January 1993.
30 See ICRC study
31 Article 43(1) API
32 Ibid, Article 50(1)
33 Ibid, Article 51(3)
The definition of a combatant is contained in Article 4A GC III and Article 43(1) API. 34  
Article 43(1) is the wider definition of the two, and includes members of all organized 
armed forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to a party to the 
conflict.  They must be subject to an internal disciplinary system.
Combatants have the right to participate directly in hostilities.35   In order for them to 
partake of this right, they must distinguish themselves from the civilian population.36  They 
must abide by  the rules of IHL,37  although violations of the rules do not deprive a 
combatant of his combatant status.38  The right to participate directly in hostilities means 
that the combatant is a lawful target at all times unless he is, for example, hors de 
combat.39  
Civilians enjoy general protection against the dangers arising from military operations.40 
They enjoy  a range of protection against attacks.  Firstly, they  are protected from 
deliberate attacks.41  Acts where the primary  purpose is to spread terror or violence among 
civilians are prohibited.42  Attacks by  way of reprisals,43 and the use of civilians as military 
shields are also prohibited.44  Secondly, civilians are not to be subjected to indiscriminate 
attacks.45  Thirdly, parties to the conflict are under a duty to take constant care to spare the 
civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.46  They must take precautions during an 
16
34 Also see Article 3 HR.
35 Article 43(2) API and Article 3 HR
36Article 44(3) API
37 See Fleck, The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, para 311 p94, which argues that while the 
rule requiring combatants to abide with the rules of IHL is only mentioned briefly in Article 44(2) API, it 
constitutes a codification of a general principle of IHL, which has crystallized as customary international law.
38 Article 43(2) API
39 See below p18
40 API Article 51(1)
41 Ibid, Article 51(2)
42 Ibid
43 Ibid, Article 51(6)
44 Ibid, Article 51(7)
45 Ibid, Article 51(4) and (5), which define “indiscriminate attacks”
46 Ibid, Article 57(1)
attack by doing everything feasible to verify that the objects to be attacked are military 
rather than civilian; and take precautions in the choice of means or methods of attack with 
a view to avoiding, or at least minimizing, incidental loss of civilian lives, injury to civilians 
or damage to civilian objects.47  They must refrain from launching an attack which may  be 
expected to cause loss of civilian life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects, which 
is excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated; and must 
cancel or suspend an attack if this proves to be the case, or if the objective turns out to be 
civilian when it was thought to be military. 48   If a choice is possible between several 
military objectives with a similar military advantage, then parties to the conflict must chose 
the objective which will cause least danger to civilian lives and objects.49
If a civilian takes a direct part in hostilities, then these protections do not apply.  There is 
no definition of what constitutes taking a direct part in hostilities in treaty law.50  The ICRC 
Commentaries define “direct" participation as:
“acts of war which by their nature or purpose are likely to cause actual harm to 
the personnel and equipment of the enemy armed forces.”51 
While a civilian is directly  participating in hostilities, he loses his protection as a civilian 
under IHL and becomes a legitimate target.  He can therefore be lawfully killed. Once he 
stops directly participating, then he regains his protection.52  
IHL therefore supports the Judgement to some extent.  Although it is legal under IHL to kill 
both combatants and civilians in an IAC, the circumstances in which they may be legally 
killed are very different.  Combatants have the right to participate directly in hostilities and 
are a legal target at all times unless hors de combat.53   Civilians may not be directly 
17
47 Ibid, Article 57(2)(a)
48 Ibid, Article 57(2)(a)(iii); Article 57(2)(b) and Article 51(5)(b)
49 Ibid, Article 57(3)
50 See ICRC Guidance p 41
51 See para 1944
52 Article 57(3) API However, see ICRC Guidance, Section II(3), regarding civilians who assume a continuous 
combat function
53 See below p18
targeted unless they are taking a direct part in hostilities, but may be killed, providing their 
deaths occur in accordance with the rules outlined above.  The law therefore provides that 
combatants can legally be subjected to violence and death in situations where a civilian 
may not be.  
Be that as it may, IHL does not provide that any violence against combatants, or any death 
of a combatant is legal.  IHL extends protection to combatants who are hors de combat. It 
also restricts the means and methods of warfare which may be used against combatants.  
2.2.2! ! Combatants who are Hors de Combat
A combatant is hors de combat if he is in enemy hands and has clearly  expressed a wish 
to surrender,  has been rendered unconscious, or is otherwise incapacitated by wounds or 
sickness.  He cannot be made the object of an attack, provided that he abstains from any 
hostile act, and does not attempt to escape.54  No vengeance can be taken against him, 
even if he fights up until the moment of surrender.  Under customary law, those who are 
hors de combat must be treated humanely.55 Murder is prohibited,56 as is torture, cruel or 
inhumane treatment, and outrages upon personal dignity.57  Corporal punishment is 
forbidden,58  and so too are mutilation, medical or scientific experiments or other medical 
procedures not necessitated by the state of health of the person concerned.59
Combatants who are parachuting from an aircraft in distress must not be made the object 
of an attack.60   Once they reach the ground they  are to be given the opportunity  to 
surrender before being made the object of attack, unless it is apparent that they are 
engaging in a hostile act.
18
54 Article 41 API; Article 23(c) HR and ICRC Study Rule 47
55 ICRC Study, Rule 87
56 Ibid, Rule 89
57 Ibid, Rule 90
58 Ibid, Rule 91
59 Ibid, Rule 92
60 API Article 42, also ibid Rule 48
Geneva Conventions I, II and III give more detailed protection to combatants who are 
wounded, sick or shipwrecked and combatants who are captured.
2.2.2.1! Combatants who are Wounded, Sick or Shipwrecked
The provisions protecting combatants who are wounded, sick or shipwrecked can be 
traced back to the very foundations of IHL, when Henry Dunant attended the Battle of 
Solferino in 1859.61
The basic rules are contained in Article 10 API, which provides that all wounded, sick and 
shipwrecked, to whichever Party they belong, shall be respected and protected.  In all 
circumstances they  are to be treated humanely and are to receive, to the fullest extent 
practicable, and with the least possible delay, the medical attention required by their 
condition.  Article 11 provides protection for such persons´ health and medical integrity.  
Articles 10 and 11 are in effect a summarising of the more detailed protection given under 
GC I and GC  II.  GC I protects armed forces in the field, whilst GC II concerns the 
treatment of those at sea.  The protection extended under both is similar.  They require 
that members of the armed forces62 who are wounded and sick, are to be respected and 
protected in all circumstances.  They are to be treated humanely and cared for by  the party 
to the conflict in whose power they are in.63  Any attempts upon their lives, or violence to 
their persons, is prohibited, in particular, murder, extermination, torture and biological 
experiments.  They are not wilfully  to be left without medical assistance or care, or be kept 
in conditions exposing them to contagion or infection.  Wounded and sick combatants who 
fall into enemy hands are PoWs.64
19
61 See Dunant, H, A Memory of Solferino, Geneva, 1862
62 It also protects those referred to in Articles 13 GC I and GC II
63 This is also customary international law, see Rule 110 ICRC Study
64 Article 14 GC I, Article 16 GCII
Under GC  I, if a party to the conflict is compelled to abandon wounded or sick to the 
enemy, they must leave them with medical personnel and material to assist, as far as 
military conditions permit.65
At all times, particularly  after an engagement, parties to the conflict must, without delay, 
take all possible measures to search for and collect the wounded and sick and to protect 
them against pillage and ill treatment; to ensure their adequate care and to search for the 
dead and prevent them from being despoiled.66   Reprisals against the wounded and sick 
are prohibited.67
GC II contains provisions regarding military hospital ships, which have been built or 
equipped solely  with a view to transporting the wounded, sick and shipwrecked.68   They 
are never to be attacked or captured, and are to be respected and protected at all times.69
These Treaty provisions give sick, injured and shipwrecked combatants the right to be 
treated humanely.  They are not to be left, as they were at the battle of Solferino, to die or 
be murdered by enemy combatants or civilians.  A combatant has the right to be removed 
from the battlefield, and to be given appropriate medical treatment.  In the event that 
conditions dictate that the Party to the conflict must abandon him, they are under an 
obligation to ensure that he has medical care if possible.  In the event that a combatant 
comes upon an injured enemy combatant, he must give the casualty such care as he has 
at his command, and must endeavour to hand him over to a medical unit.70  If the injured 
combatant falls into enemy hands, then he is to be treated as a PoW, and is to receive 
medical care on a par with that given to the enemy´s combatants.71  
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2.2.2.2 ! Combatants who are Captured
One of the principal rights of a combatant in an IAC is that, if he is captured by the enemy, 
he becomes a PoW.72  He can be interned without any particular procedure, or for any 
particular reason, for the purpose of his internment is to prevent him from being able to 
directly participate in hostilities.  He cannot be punished simply  because he took part in 
the hostilities.
PoWs are in the hands of the Detaining Power which is responsible for them, not in the 
hands of individuals or military units.73  Unlawful acts or omissions by a Detaining Power 
causing death or seriously  endangering the health of a PoW  are prohibited, and constitute 
a serious breach of the Convention. 74 
If there is any doubt as to whether or not a person who falls in to enemy hands qualifies as 
a PoW, there is a presumption that they do, until such time as their status has been 
determined by a competent tribunal.75  The right to be a PoW cannot be renounced.76
Once a combatant is captured, he is bound only  to give limited information to the capturer, 
such as surname and rank.  He is not to be subjected to physical or mental torture, or to 
any threats or unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any  kind if he refuses to 
answer questions.77  He must be evacuated as soon as possible after capture to a camp 
situated in an area far enough from the combat zone for him to be out of danger,78  and 
must not be unnecessarily exposed to danger whilst awaiting evacuation from the combat 
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zone.79   Any evacuation must be conducted humanely and in conditions similar to the 
armed forces of the Detaining Power in their changes of station.80
It is illegal to kill PoWs if holding them would impede or endanger military operations.  If a 
person entitled to PoW status falls into enemy hands in unusual conditions of combat, 
making it impossible to evacuate him, then he is to be released and all feasible 
precautions taken to ensure his safety.81
PoWs must be humanely treated at all times. and protected at all times, particularly 
against acts of violence or intimidation, and against insults and public curiosity.82  They are 
entitled to respect for their persons and their honour,83  and are to be given free 
maintenance and medical treatment if required.84
PoWs may be interned, but there are strict rules regarding the conditions of internment. 
The premises must be hygienic, healthy  and out of danger. 85  Their presence cannot be 
used to render areas immune from military operations.86   They are to be given shelters 
against air bombardments and other hazards of war to the same extent as the local civilian 
population.87  Information regarding the location of PoW camps is to be given to the other 
parties to the conflict, and the camps are to be clearly  marked so as to be visible from the 
air.88 They are to be quartered in conditions as favourable as those for the forces of the 
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Detaining Power.89   They are to have access to medical care90  and are to be kept in 
sanitary conditions.91  
IHL makes allowance for the fact that a State may require its combatants who become 
PoWs to endeavour to escape.92  In the event that a PoW  escapes successfully and is 
subsequently  recaptured, he may not be punished.93  An unsuccessful escape can only be 
punished by disciplinary action.94 The use of weapons of war, especially against those who 
are escaping, or are trying to escape, constitutes an extreme measure and must always be 
preceded by appropriate warnings.95
If a PoW  is to be tried for an offence, then he is to be subject to the laws in force in the 
armed forces of the Detaining Power.96  Any disciplinary punishment must not be inhuman, 
brutal or dangerous to the health of PoWs.97   Escape, or repeated escape, is not to be 
deemed to be an aggravating circumstance if the PoW  is subjected to trial by judicial 
proceedings.98
In the event that the Detaining Power practices the death penalty, the PoW  is to be 
informed as soon as possible as to which offences this applies to.99   If the court is 
considering imposing the death penalty, they are required to take into account, to the 
widest extent possible, that the accused is not a national of the Detaining Power, is not 
bound to it by  any duty of allegiance and that he is in its power as the result of 
circumstances independent of his own free will.100  If the death penalty is imposed then the 
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Protecting Power must be informed, and the penalty  cannot be enforced for six months 
after notification.101
If we compare the situation of a captured PoW  to a captured civilian, or a civilian who has 
directly participated in the hostilities.  Neither of these groups is entitled to be treated as a 
PoW.  A civilian who is not directly participating in the hostilities, including those who 
commit an offence solely designed to harm the Occupying Power,102  are protected by GC 
IV.  If they commit an offence then they  may be incarcerated by the Occupying Power, and 
are entitled to some basic rights under GC IV.103  However, they are a regular prisoner, in 
contrast with the special status of PoWs.  Once the conflict has ended they must then be 
handed over to the Territorial Power, but may be required to serve the remainder of their 
sentence.104
A civilian who has been directly participating is not entitled to the protection of GC IV,105 
but must instead rely on the fundamental guarantees contained in Article 75 API.106  This 
contains the “bare bones” of fair treatment, such as the right to be treated humanely and to 
be tried by an impartial court.
It is therefore evident that the Conventions and Additional Protocols give significant 
protection to a combatant who is captured by the enemy.  He is protected from the 
moment of capture.107  He must be humanely treated at all times, and more often than not 
is entitled to standards of protection and care which are on a par with that accorded to the 
forces of the Detaining Power.108   A captured combatant in an IAC is arguably given 
stronger, more detailed protection under GC III than a captured civilian is entitled to under 
GC IV.  He is certainly  given better protection than a civilian who is captured after directly 
participating in the hostilities.  
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2.2.3 ! ! Restrictions on Means and Methods of Warfare
A further core principle of IHL is that the right of the parties to a conflict to adopt means of 
injuring the enemy is not unlimited.109   This concept of limited warfare requires that a 
compromise must be reached between military requirements on the one hand, and 
humanitarian ones, on the other.  It is, of course, intended to protect civilians, civilian 
property,110  and the environment,111  but it also aims to protect combatants from the worst 
excesses of war.
2.2.3.1 ! Means of warfare
If we turn firstly  to restrictions on the means of warfare.  Article 36(1)  API requires a Party 
to the Conventions, when engaged in the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a 
new means or method of warfare, to determine whether the proposed weapon is in 
accordance with IHL.
There have been agreements seeking to restrict the means of warfare since the 19th 
century.  Many  agreements seek to protect both civilians and combatants.  The ICJ has 
stated:112
“humanitarian law at a very early stage, prohibited certain types of weapons 
either because of their indiscriminate effect on combatants and civilians or 
because of the unnecessary suffering caused to combatants, that is to say a 
harm greater than that unavoidable to achieve legitimate military objectives.”
The St Petersburg Declaration of 1868 is an example of this.113   It renounces the use in 
times of war of explosive projectiles under 400 grammes of weight.  The preamble to the 
Declaration provides:
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“That the progress of civilization should have the effect of alleviating as much as 
possible the calamities of war;
That the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish 
during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy;
That for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of 
men;
That this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly 
aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevitable;
That the employment of such arms would, therefore, be contrary to the laws of 
humanity.” 
Other examples of treaties which protect combatants, include Hague Declaration II and III 
of 1899, which, respectively, prohibit the use of projectiles, the only object of which is the 
diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases; and the use of bullets which expand or 
flatten easily in the human body (so called “dum-dum” bullets);114  and the Hague 
Regulation of 1907 which prohibits the use of poison or poisonous weapons.115  
In more modern times, treaties have been ratified which seek to restrict the weaponry 
which can be used in an armed conflict.  Some of these treaties are solely aimed at 
minimizing the suffering caused to civilians.116  However, several aim to protect both 
civilians and combatants.  Examples of these include treaties prohibiting: the development 
and use of chemical weapons;117  the use of any weapon where the primary effect is to 
injure by fragments which escape detection by x-rays in the human body,118  the use of 
26
114 Final Act of the International Peace Conference, The Hague 29 July 1899, Declarations II and III, also 
see ICRC Study, Rule 77 
115 HR Article 23(a), and see also Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other 
Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, Geneva 17 June 1925 and ICRC Study, Rule 72
116 Such as Protocol III (on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the use of Incendiary Weapons ) to the Convention 
on the Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to 
be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, 10 October 1980; and the Convention on the 
prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti Personnel Mines and On Their 
Destruction, 18 September 1997
117  Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on their Destruction, 3 September 1992; see also ICRC Study, Rule 74
118 Protocol I (on non Detectable Fragments) to the Convention on the Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have 
Indiscriminate Effects, 10 October 1980, see also ICRC Study, Rule 86
mines or booby traps to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering;119  the use of 
blinding laser weapons;120  and the development, use and stockpiling of cluster 
munitions.121
2.2.3.2! Methods of Warfare
The limitations on methods of warfare derive from three premises:122 firstly, that the choice 
of methods of warfare is not unlimited;123  secondly, that it is prohibited to use methods of 
warfare of a nature designed to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering;124  and, 
thirdly, that the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish during 
war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy.125
There are several provisions in IHL which forbid acts which cause unnecessary suffering to 
civilians, examples include: the prohibition against acts where the primary purpose is to 
spread terror among the civilian population;126  the prohibition against starving the civilian 
population;127  and the prohibition against attacking or destroying objects indispensable to 
the survival of the civilian population.128   There are also provisions in IHL, the purpose of 
which, is to protect combatants.
Firstly, perfidy is prohibited.129   A  perfidious act is one which invites the confidence of an 
adversary by leading him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to, accord protection 
under IHL.  Examples, listed in Article 37(1) API, include feigning of an intent to negotiate 
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under a flag of truce, or of a surrender; and feigning of an incapacitation by wounds or 
sickness.  Perfidy can be contrasted with ruses of war, which mislead an adversary or 
induce him to act recklessly, which are permitted.130  
Secondly, it is forbidden to order that there shall be no quarter (no survivors).131   The 
purpose of this prohibition is to prevent the combatant from being killed once they come 
under the power of the enemy.  
2.2.4!  ! Concluding remarks regarding IACs
During an IAC, a combatant has the right to take a direct part in the hostilities, with the 
result that he too can be legally attacked and killed.  However, he is not subject to absolute 
war, he has protection against some kinds of weapon: those which are deemed to inflict 
unnecessary suffering on the combatant, going above and beyond the aim of simply 
weakening the military forces of the enemy.  
The moment a combatant is hors de combat, whether due to being wounded, sick, or 
shipwrecked; captured or due to surrendering to the enemy; he is no longer a legitimate 
target and must be protected by the enemy State.132  
Violating many of these provisions constitutes a grave breach of the Conventions. Grave 
breaches include willful killing; torture and inhumane treatment; compelling a PoW to serve 
in the forces of a hostile power; and attacking a person in the knowledge that he is hors de 
combat.133   The Parties to the Conventions are under an obligation to search for those 
alleged to have committed such grave breaches and to try  them before their own courts, or 
hand them over for trial to other Parties.134  Those who violate the provisions may be guilty 
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of war crimes, and could face proceedings before the International Criminal Court.135  They 
may also be liable to prosecution under the domestic law of the State concerned.
2.3! ! NON INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS
The law distinguishes between different situations which can occur within the borders of a 
State: firstly, internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots and isolated and sporadic 
acts of violence, to which IHL does not apply.136  Secondly, internal armed conflicts 
between a State´s armed forces and armed factions within a State, or internal armed 
conflict between the factions.  Thirdly, internal armed conflict between a State´s armed 
forces and an organised armed faction which reaches the level required for AP II to come 
into operation.137  Finally, armed conflicts defined in AP I Article 1(4), which are treated as 
IACs.  
As already noted, most of the Geneva Conventions do not apply in NIACs.   Historically, 
“there were very  few international rules governing civil commotion, for States 
preferred to regard internal strife as rebellion, mutiny and treason coming within 
the purview of national criminal law and, by the same token, to exclude any 
possible intrusion by other States into their own domestic jurisdiction. This 
dichotomy was clearly sovereignty-oriented and reflected the traditional 
configuration of the international community, based on the coexistence of 
sovereign States more inclined to look after their own interests than community 
concerns or humanitarian demands.”138
However in recent years, particularly since the forming of the ICTY, there has been a trend 
to extend the ambit of customary law into NIACs.139  
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Treaty  law relating to NIACs is contained in CA 3 and in AP II.  CA 3 applies in all NIACs, 
whereas AP II only applies in those NIACs which reach the required threshold provided for 
in Article 1(2).
2.3.1! ! The Status of Combatants in NIACs
Unlike in IACs, treaty law relating to NIACs does not refer to the status of combatants, 
indeed the status of a combatant in a NIAC is controversial.140  The participants in a NIAC 
are subject to the law of the State in which the conflict occurs, meaning they may not be 
rendered immune from prosecution.  A member of a dissident armed force who kills a 
member of the regular armed forces may be prosecuted for murder, or other offences 
against the person.  A member of the regular armed forces who kills a dissident or a 
civilian may also, potentially, face prosecution.  The status of a combatant in a NIAC is 
therefore often unclear.
There is a strong contrast between IACs and NIACs regarding how IHL is enforced.  In 
IACs, procedures are provided in the Conventions and AP I regarding how this should 
happen.141  In NIACs, CA3 provides only that the ICRC may offer to provide its 
humanitarian services, whereas AP II provides simply  that its text must be disseminated as 
widely as possible.142   The enforcement of IHL during a NIAC is therefore very much 
dependent upon domestic law.  Serious offences may fall under the jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court.143
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2.3.2! ! Protection given by Common Article 3
CA 3 contains the minimum protection which is to be provided in NIACs. It states that 
persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who 
have laid down their arms, and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, 
detention or any other cause, shall be treated humanely and without any adverse 
distinction based on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other criteria. 
In connection with these persons, it prohibits murder; mutilation; cruel treatment and 
torture; the taking of hostages; outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment; and the passing of sentences and carrying out of executions without 
previous judgement.
2.3.3! ! Protection given by Additional Protocol II
AP II gives more detailed protection than CA 3.
Article 4 contains fundamental guarantees for all who are not taking a direct part, or who 
have ceased to take a direct part in hostilities, and therefore applies to combatants.  It 
applies whether or not their liberty has been restricted.  They are to be treated humanely, 
without adverse distinction.  It is prohibited to order that there be no survivors.   It prohibits 
violence to life, health and physical or mental well being of such persons, in particular 
murder and cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation and any  form of corporal 
punishment.  It forbids collective punishments, the taking of hostages, outrages upon 
personal dignity and any threats to commit these acts.  
With regard to the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, all are to be respected and 
protected.144   In all circumstances they are to be treated humanely  and are to receive 
medical attention.145  Whenever circumstances permit, and particularly after an 
engagement, all possible measures are to be taken to search for and collect the wounded, 
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sick and shipwrecked, to protect them against pillage and ill treatment and to ensure their 
adequate care.146
Turning to those who are captured by the enemy, a captured combatant has no right to 
become a PoW in a NIAC.  If AP II applies, Article 5 provides some protection for those 
who are deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict.  It requires, at a 
minimum, that those who have been detained are, to the same extent as the local civilian 
population, to be provided with food and water and afforded health and hygiene 
safeguards and protection against the rigours of the climate and the dangers of the armed 
conflict.147  The wounded and sick are to be given treatment.148  They are not to be located 
close to the combat zone, and must be evacuated if they become exposed to the dangers 
arising from the armed conflict.149  They are to be medically examined.150  Their physical or 
mental health and integrity are not to be endangered by an unjustified act or omission.151  
In relation to the prosecution and punishment of criminal offenses related to the armed 
conflict, no sentence may be passed and no penalty executed on a person unless 
pursuant to a conviction by an independent and impartial court.152  
It is clear that whilst AP II does not give the more detailed protection given under the 
Conventions and AP I, it still provides combatants with some basic protections in the event 
that they become hors de combat.  However the protection of AP II is limited by virtue of 
the fact that it does not apply in most NIACs due to the high threshold which must be 
reached before it comes into operation.153
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2.3.4! ! Other Treaties which apply in NIACs
Some of the treaties concerning means of warfare apply  in both IACs and NIACs. 
Examples include the Blinding Weapons Protocol 1995,154  the Mines Protocol 1996155 and 
the Land Mines Convention, where State Parties undertake never in any circumstances to 
develop, produce, or otherwise use, anti personnel mines.156 
2.3.5! ! Customary International Law in NIACs
Customary law provides some more protections for combatants in NIACs.  
The rule that, whenever circumstances permit, each part to the conflict must take all 
possible measures to search for, collect and evacuate the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, 
is part of customary law.157   Such persons are to receive the medical attention and care 
which they  require with the least possible delay, and to the fullest extent practicable, with 
no distinction made apart from on medical grounds.158  Each party to the conflict is to take 
all possible measures to protect the wounded, sick and shipwrecked against ill treatment 
and pillage of their personal property.159
Those whom are hors de combat must be treated humanely;160 murder is prohibited,161 as 
is torture, cruel or inhumane treatment and outrages upon personal dignity;162  corporal 
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punishment is forbidden,163 and so too are mutilation, medical or scientific experiments or 
other medical procedures not indicated by the state of health of the person concerned.164 
Those deprived of their liberty are to be provided with adequate food, water, clothing, 
shelter and medical attention.165 
The prohibition against the use of means and methods of warfare which are of a nature to 
cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, is customary law.166  It is prohibited to 
use weapons which are by their very nature indiscriminate.167
The prohibitions against the use of poisoned weapons;168  biological weapons;169 chemical 
weapons170; expanding bullets;171  exploding bullets;172  weapons where the primary effect 
is to injure by fragments which are not detectable by x-rays and blinding laser weapons,173 
are customary law independently of treaty law.
It is prohibited to use incendiary weapons against combatants unless it is not feasible to 
use a less harmful weapon to render them hors de combat.174
The prohibition against ordering that no quarter should be given is part of customary 
law,175  as are the prohibitions against attacking those who are hors de combat,176  and 
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attacking persons parachuting from an aircraft in distress.177  Killing, injuring or capturing 
an adversary by resort to perfidy is also prohibited.178
2.3.6! ! Concluding Remarks regarding NIACs
Whilst the protection given to a combatant who is hors de combat is not as extensive in a 
NIAC as in an IAC, it is clear from the above examination that combatants have the same 
basic legal protections.  They are not permitted to become PoWs, but are still entitled to 
the basic necessities of life and to medical care should they be captured.   In addition, as 
in IACs, they are protected from certain types of weapons and means of warfare.  
2.4! ! THE MARTENS CLAUSE
Finally, mention must be made of the “Martens Clause”.  This clause runs throughout IHL. 
It was first included in the Hague Convention of 1899,179  and has appeared in the 
preamble to many treaties on the subject since then.  A  modern version of the clause is 
contained in Article 1(2) AP I, and reads:
! “In cases not covered by this Protocol or by any other international 
! agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and 
! authority of the principles of international law derived from established 
! custom, from the principles of humanity, and from the dictates of public 
! conscience.”180
Thus, where the law is silent, principles of humanity must prevail.  This clause has been 
referred to many times by  courts and by law makers when interpreting IHL.181  It serves to 
protect all of those involved in an armed conflict, including combatants.
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2.5! ! DOES IHL SUPPORT THE JUDGEMENT?
IHL allows for violence and deaths to legally occur in war.  It accepts that both civilians and 
combatants will be wounded and killed.  There remains a clear distinction between the law 
which applies in IACs and that which applies in NIACs.  
In IACs, the provision for combatants to be legally killed is much wider than that for 
civilians, unless a civilian is directly participating in the hostilities.  To that extent, the 
Judgement is correct: combatants are exposed to more danger than civilians, and can 
expect to be subjected to violence and threats to their life in situations where civilians can 
expect to be protected.  In NIACs, the situation is less clear, and much will depend upon 
the domestic law of the State.  Combatants do not necessarily have the right to directly 
participate in hostilities, and it is questionable whether they can be legally killed under IHL.
Once hors de combat, IHL seeks to ensure that a combatant is not at the mercy of the 
enemy. He is then entitled to expect a certain standard of treatment, and is protected from 
violence, although the extent of this protection varies depending upon whether the 
combatant is participating in an IAC or a NIAC.  A combatant also has protection, in both 
IACs and NIACs, from certain types of weapon, and from the basic provision that weapons 
should not cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. 
Not all violence towards combatants is legal during war.  Combatants can expect 
protection under IHL as soon as they are wounded, captured or surrender.  There are 
many situations where a combat can be killed unlawfully.  The Judgement is therefore not 
fully supported by IHL.
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CHAPTER 3
IS THE JUDGEMENT SUPPORTED BY INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW?
3.1! ! INTRODUCTION
HRL applies both in times of peace, and in times of war.182   During wartime, there is an 
overlap  between IHL and HRL.  The relationship  between these areas of law is complex, 
and much debated by  academics.183  HRL is contained in global and regional 
instruments,184 and in customary international law.185   
Three general issues must be addressed before moving on to the main discussion.  
The first concerns jurisdiction.  In IHL, all High Contracting Parties agree to respect and to 
ensure respect for the Conventions in all circumstances.186   Once it is accepted that an 
armed conflict is occurring, IHL applies to all of those involved to some degree. 
Jurisdiction under HRL is entirely different.  The position varies according to each 
instrument,187  but the obligation to respect HRL is much narrower and open to 
interpretation than IHL.  A State is required to abide by the human rights instruments to 
which it is party in relation to individuals on its territory, but the rights owed by a State to 
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individuals it interacts with on foreign soil are less clear.188   In the UK, for example, the 
Supreme Court has held that British soldiers are not within UK jurisdiction for the purposes 
of the Human Rights Act 1998 when they leave their military base.189 
The second issue concerns who is obliged to protect human rights.  The traditional view 
was that HRL places obligations on States, not individuals.  Some commentators argue 
that this view is outdated or was never the case, and that non State actors, such as armed 
opposition groups, are also obliged to uphold HRL.190   This debate is of particular 
importance in NIACs, and shall be discussed in more detail below.191
The third, and final, issue concerns the avenues available to individuals to enforce their 
human rights, for “human rights become a living reality only through appropriate 
procedures and mechanisms”.192   Some regional human rights instruments, such as 
ECHR, ACHR and  ACHPR, have their own enforcement procedures.193 Some provide for 
organisations which monitor the implementation of the instrument.  These may contain a 
mechanism for individual complaints, although the decisions which they issue are 
generally  not binding on the States in question.194   Other instruments do not provide for 
any direct method of enforcement.195   Where instruments do provide for enforcement 
procedures, there are often impediments to enforcing the rights in practice, for example, 
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long time delays before a case is heard.196  States may have enacted HRL into domestic 
legislation, and on a national level, an individual may  have more success in protecting their 
human rights.197  
The human rights which are relevant to this discussion are the right to life, and the right to 
freedom from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment.  The extent to which these 
apply  to a combatant will vary  according to whether he is operating in wartime or in 
peacetime.  
3.2! THE RIGHT TO LIFE
The right to life is the most fundamental of human rights.198  It can be found in several 
instruments, including Article 3 UDHR; Article 6 ICCPR and Article 2 ECHR.199
3.2.1! ! The Right to Life during an IAC
During a war, it is accepted that a combatant may lose his life.200  Is it possible to reconcile 
this with the concept of a right to life, or does a combatant forfeit the right for the duration 
of the conflict?
The ECHR applies to both civilians and combatants.201   The right to life is contained in 
Article 2.  No derogation is permitted from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting 
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from lawful acts of war.202  A State is required to issue an official derogation notice in such 
a situation, otherwise the normal legal background applies.203  
Turning to ICCPR, Article 6 states that “Every human being has the inherent right to 
life....No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life”.  No derogations are permitted from 
this.204  Unlike the ECHR, there is no specific mention of whether, and to what extent,  the 
right to life can be violated in wartime.  The ICJ considered the matter in their Advisory 
Opinion on Nuclear Weapons.  They stated: 
“In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one's life applies also in 
hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls 
to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in 
armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities.”205
Under both ECHR and ICCPR therefore, a combatant can be deprived of his life, without 
his right to life being infringed, but only as a result of lawful acts of war.  
To what extent does a State have an obligation to protect the right to life of its combatants 
during an IAC?  The ECtHR has held that, for the Court to find a State in violation of its 
obligation to protect life under Article 2 of the Convention, it must be established that:
“the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a 
real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals ...and 
that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged 
reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk.”206(“the Osman test”)
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It can be profoundly difficult for parties to prove that a State had, or should have had, such 
knowledge.  
Rowe argues that it is possible to foresee a situation where a soldier may be deprived of 
his life during wartime, with the result that his State could be found to have breached his 
human rights.  He cites an example of a commander who takes little care over his plans to 
attack an enemy military installation with large numbers of his own soldiers, expecting 
many of them to be killed in the attack.  He argues that, if a reasonable commander would 
have determined that the loss of life to his own soldiers would clearly  be excessive 
compared to the concrete and direct military advantage to be gained from the attack, then 
the combatants who were issued with such an order could argue that the order to attack 
infringed their right to life.207   
However, there are significant difficulties with this example. Firstly, different commanders 
have different styles of commanding.  Some may well ask their men to carry out attacks 
which other commanders would baulk at, and regard as reckless.  It may be however, that 
the commander´s bravado pays off and the attack is successful, with the result that the 
troops gain a significant advantage which they would not otherwise have had.  Secondly, it 
is very difficult for a court, or other body, to sit in judgement on a commander and argue 
that his decisions were not those which a reasonable commander would have made.  It 
may be easy to say with hindsight that a particular order was reckless, but the court will 
have little idea of the pressures of the commander at the time, and what information he 
had about all of the variables, such as the fitness of his men, the number of enemy troops 
on the ground, the amount of ammunition they  had.  Thirdly, the test which Rowe 
suggests:  whether the loss of combatants would be excessive compared to the concrete 
and direct military advantage to be gained from the attack, is the test which IHL requires to 
be applied in relation to civilians, not combatants.208  Under IHL there is no requirement on 
military authorities to take such precautions in relation to combatants.  Fourthly, how would 
the link be shown between the commander´s actions and the knowledge of the State, as 
provided for in the Osman test?  Should the State be expected to note the actions and 
orders of all of its commanders, and thereby be found accountable if those actions are not 
up to standard?  Surely this would place too great a burden on the State? 
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Perhaps a better example of a State failing to protect the right to life of its combatants, is in 
relation to poor or malfunctioning equipment209 or lack of training.   In the British case of R 
(on the application of Smith),210 Lord Rogers cites the example of a soldier who is killed by 
a roadside bomb, which penetrates the armour plating of his vehicle.  He argues that any 
questions, such as whether the plating should have been stronger, or why that particular 
vehicle was being used, are political questions, not legal ones.211   However, if it can be 
shown that the test from Osman is met, then surely the State can be argued to have 
breached Article 2 of the Convention in respect of those combatants?  In the UK there 
have been many inquests into the deaths of British soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan.212 
The results of these investigations, and any recommendations, are reported to the Ministry 
of Defence (MOD).  If the MOD fail to act on the findings of such reports, and provide the 
troops with, for example, vehicles appropriate to the terrain,213 or adequate training for the 
equipment the troops are to use,214 then surely, if it can be shown that the faulty equipment 
represented a “real and immediate risk” to the life of its combatants, the test in Osman will 
be met, and the State can be found responsible for failing to protect the right to life of 
combatants who die in the future as a result of such faulty equipment.
The ECtHR views a State´s obligation to protect the human rights of a combatant 
differently from its obligation to protect those of a civilian.  In the case of Engel, the Court 
stated it:
“must bear in mind the particular characteristics of military life and its effects on 
the situation of individual members of the armed forces.”215
In that case the Court considered Article 5 ECHR (deprivation of liberty).  It stated:
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215 Supra FN 201, para 54.  See also Chember v Russia ECtHR, 7188/03, 3 July 2008, paras 49 and 50
“The bounds that Article 5 requires the State not to exceed are not identical for 
servicemen and civilians. A disciplinary penalty or measure which on analysis 
would unquestionably  be deemed a deprivation of liberty were it to be applied to 
a civilian may not possess this characteristic when imposed upon a 
serviceman.”216
The Court has also drawn a distinction between a State´s obligations towards a combatant 
who has been conscripted, and those towards a combatant who has volunteered.217
A State is therefore required to protect the right to life of its combatants, however it cannot 
be held responsible for deaths which occur lawfully  under IHL.  In addition, a combatant´s 
right to life is to be viewed in the context of military life.  This means that there will often be 
a different threshold for civilians and combatants when considering their right to life.
Does a State have human rights obligations towards non-national combatants?  For a 
State to be found responsible for breaching their human rights, non-national combatants 
must firstly  be within the jurisdiction of the State.218  This will be a major stumbling block in 
many situations, for example deaths by  soldiers from friendly fire will mainly occur off 
base, and therefore out with the jurisdiction of the State.219   In an armed conflict, most 
deaths of a non national combatant which occur within a State´s jurisdiction will occur 
when the non national combatant is in the custody of a State as a PoW.  In that case IHL 
will apply. 220 
The death penalty is also relevant to the discussion of the right to life of a combatant 
during an IAC.  The legal position is different regarding a State´s own combatants, and 
enemy combatants.
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As regards a State´s own combatants, national law and HRL will apply.  Many States have 
abolished the death penalty during peacetime, however they may wish to revive it during 
wartime.  The ECHR does not refer to the death penalty, however a subsequent Protocol 
to the Convention agrees to its abolition among the Member States of the Council of 
Europe.221  The Protocol allows for the death penalty to be revived in time of war, providing 
a State is permitted to do so under national law.222   
With regard to the ICCPR, in respect of countries which have not abolished the death 
penalty, it only allows for a sentence of death to be imposed in respect of the most serious 
of crimes, in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime.223
Thus, it can be permissible under HRL for a State to impose a sentence of death providing 
that the State´s national law permits it to do so.  This applies equally to combatants and 
civilians.  
For a combatant who is in enemy hands, and therefore a PoW, IHL would apply, and the 
application of the death penalty would be governed by GC  III.224  For a sentence of death 
to be lawful under GC III, it must be permitted under the national law of the enemy State. 
One notable difference between Article 6(2) ICCPR and GC III in this respect, is that there 
is no requirement that the imposition of death sentences upon PoWs be for serious 
offences.225    An enemy combatant can therefore be executed for more minor offences 
under IHL, than may be permitted under HRL.
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3.2.2! The Right to Life during a NIAC
The complex relationship between IHL and HRL is particularly important in NIACs.  Moir 
argues, “much of the humanitarian law applicable to internal conflict mirrors human rights 
provisions”.226  
The basic legal situation in NIACs is the same as in IACs, namely that, providing a 
combatant is killed in accordance with IHL, the death will not violate HRL.  Rowe argues 
that a practical method of determining whether a killing in a NIAC is lawful under IHL, is to 
ask whether it was caused in a way  that is not prohibited by the Rome Statute.  If so, it can 
be classified as a lawful act of war.227   However, the Rome Statute is not customary law, 
and does not contain a definitive code of all war crimes.228  Using this method to determine 
whether or not a killing was lawful, would mean that killings which are unlawful under 
customary international law, but not under the Rome Statute, would not be included.
In a NIAC, the issue of who is obliged to uphold HRL becomes crucial. The actors in such 
conflicts often comprise of a State, with its combatants on one side, fighting against one or 
more armed opposition groups.  The State and accordingly, its combatants, will be bound 
to adhere to HRL, but to what extent do international human rights instruments bind the 
armed opposition groups who are involved in the conflict?  
Some argue that the obligation to uphold human rights can be held against the State only, 
and cannot be held against armed opposition groups.229  Moir argues:
“Human rights obligations are binding on governments only, and the law has not 
yet reached a stage whereby, during internal armed conflict, insurgents are 
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229 See Zegveld, L; Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups In International Law; Cambridge University 
Press  p 53 
bound to observe the human rights of armed forces, let alone of opposing 
insurgents.”230
Others argue that this is no longer a valid assumption:
“If non-state actors have human rights, it appears logical that they must also 
have responsibilities, no different from the obligations insurgents have under 
international humanitarian law.  There is a clear trend to subject non-state 
actors to human rights law”.231   
Tomuschat argues that a customary international law rule has formed, and cites numerous 
Security Council Resolutions which require armed opposition groups to put an end to 
human rights violations.232   Security  Council Resolutions are binding on the members of 
the UN,233  but to what extent are they indicative of customary international law?  In their 
Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, the ICJ considered General Assembly Resolutions, 
and noted that, even though they are not binding, they do have a normative effect, and in 
certain circumstances could provide important evidence for establishing the emergence of 
a rule or of opinio juris. The court stated that a series of resolutions may indicate a new 
rule.234   Following this reasoning, a series of Security Council Resolutions could be 
indicative of a new rule of customary  international law, and indeed, as Security  Council 
Resolutions are binding, in contrast to General Assembly ones, it could be argued that less 
evidence would be required to prove a new customary rule has formed.  However it is 
likely  that a court would require more than this to find that a customary rule had 
crystallised.  In addition, such a rule would involve customary law binding not States, or 
state agents, but rather non State organisations and individuals directly, which would be 
controversial.
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Even if it is correct that the obligation to uphold human rights extends to armed opposition 
groups, it is difficult to envisage how this could be enforced.  
Firstly, it may be that such groups are simply unaware of their obligations under 
international law.  Secondly, a group may agree to apply  IHL, and adhere to certain human 
rights standards,235 but to what extent are such groups capable of fulfilling the obligations 
they undertake?236  In a situation where a group  has control of a particular area then they 
may be in a position to take measures to protect human rights, but often they simply  will 
not have the discipline or authority to do this.  Thirdly, the more formal enforcement 
mechanisms in the international HRL regime, such as courts, apply to States only. 
International organisations and NGOs may endeavour to engage such groups in agreeing 
to codes of conduct or declarations on the matter, but these are not enforceable.  Fourthly, 
how would it be possible to hold an armed opposition group accountable?  If a State is 
found to be in breach of HRL, it can be fined, or requested to change its practices, but how 
possible is this with an armed group?  These are illegal organisations, perhaps with little, 
or no formal structure.  They are not a business, and have no income to pay a fine.  Who 
can force them to change their practices?  Tomuschat argues that commencing criminal 
proceedings against the leader of an insurgent movement is an indirect remedy against 
the movement itself- if a political leader has to face criminal charges, it will often have a 
devastating effect on the movement.237   However, in prosecuting a leader, the law which 
applies will be criminal law, whether domestic or international, not HRL.  Not all breaches 
of HRL are also breaches of criminal law.  In addition, this presupposes that the leader of 
the group is indispensable to the survival of the group, which may often not be the case.
In a NIAC, the question of whether the armed group  against whom a combatant is fighting 
has the obligation to uphold human rights law, is unresolved.  Much will depend on the 
group itself, how organised it is, and how desirous it is to be accepted as a member of the 
international community.  One thing is certain, and that is that in a NIAC, a combatant 
cannot depend on insurgent groups to protect his human rights.
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3.2.3! ! The Right to Life during Peacetime
As in wartime, any death of a combatant in peacetime should be viewed in the context of 
the military and the military life.238  Most deaths which occur in peacetime, will not be as a 
result of a deliberate act by  the State, but shall instead be due to recklessness or 
negligence.  The difficulty will arise in proving the link between a combatant´s death and 
the State´s involvement.239 
3.3! ! THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM FROM TORTURE
The right to freedom from torture encompasses the prohibition of seven distinct forms of 
conduct: torture, cruel treatment, inhuman treatment, degrading treatment, cruel 
punishment, inhuman punishment and degrading punishment.240  The right is enshrined in 
several human rights instruments, including Article 5 UDHR; Article 7 ICCPR, Article 3 
ECHR and CAT.241  It is a jus cogens norm.242
The right to freedom from torture is non derogable,243  and cannot be deviated from even 
during times of war and public emergency.  It therefore applies irrespectively  of whether 
the conflict is an IAC or a NIAC.  The conduct of the victim is irrelevant.244   Torture and 
inhuman and degrading treatment are war crimes,245 and constitute grave breaches of the 
Conventions. 246  There is no requirement that the perpetrator be acting in an official 
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capacity for them to be found guilty of torture.247   For a State to be found guilty of 
breaching an individual´s rights under Article 3 ECHR and Article 7 ICCPR, it is necessary 
to show a link between the perpetrator and the State.248  
In a NIAC, with respect to the armed opposition against whom the combatant is fighting, 
the same issues arise as discussed above,249  namely whether these groups are legally 
obliged to protect a combatant´s right to freedom from torture.  Clearly, individual 
perpetrators can be held to account under ICL.250 
The right not to be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment has special significance 
in relation to combatants, particularly  during peacetime.  There are many incidences when 
a combatant may be subjected to conduct, which to a civilian would constitute inhuman 
and degrading treatment.  Examples include, requiring a combatant to clean toilets with a 
toothbrush, or to cut grass with a pair of scissors.251  How does this equate with a State´s 
obligations under HRL?  
In Chember,252  the ECtHR considered whether Article 3 had been breached regarding a 
combatant who had been forced by  his superiors to perform hard physical exercise when 
his superiors knew that he had been suffering from problems with his knees.  The Court 
held:
“Many acts that would constitute degrading or inhuman treatment in respect of 
prisoners may not reach the threshold of ill-treatment when they occur in the 
armed forces, provided that they contribute to the specific mission of the armed 
forces in that they form part of, for example, training for battlefield conditions.”253 
49
247  This is customary international law, see Kunarac and others, ICTY AC, Case no. IT-96-23-T, 12 June 
2002, paras 146 and 147
248 See comments above regarding Osman, p40
249 See Section 3.2.2
250 Supra FN 245
251 See Rowe supra FN 207, p70
252 Supra FN 215
253 Ibid, para 49
The Court continued:
“Nevertheless, the State has a duty to ensure that a person performs military 
service in conditions which are compatible with respect for his human dignity, 
that the procedures and methods of military  training do not subject him to 
distress or suffering of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of hardship 
inherent in military discipline”254 
Therefore, to subject a combatant to torture, as defined in Article 1 CAT, is prohibited, as it 
is with civilians.  However, when it comes to the more grey area of inhuman and degrading 
treatment, a combatant is required to endure situations, which in a civilian context would 
constitute a breach of human rights.
3.4! ! DOES HRL SUPPORT THE JUDGEMENT?
It is evident from this examination that the application of HRL to combatants is complex.  A 
State is obliged to protect both the right to life of its combatants, and their right to freedom 
from torture.  However, such rights must be viewed in context.  If an armed conflict is 
occurring, then IHL operates as the lex specialis, and, at all times, a combatant´s human 
rights are to be viewed in the context of military  life.  HRL can require a combatant to 
endure acts which would constitute a breach of a civilian´s human rights.  It does treat 
combatants differently  to civilians.  However, as with IHL, it still gives protection to 
combatants.  A combatant continues to have a right to life, even in war.  Torture is always 
prohibited.  Even where a combatant is expected by HRL to endure harsher conditions 
than a civilian, the boundaries of such endurance are not limitless.255 
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CHAPTER 4   
WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE JUDGES´ DECISION TO RESTRICT THEIR 
JUDGEMENT TO COMBATANTS ONLY?
4.1! ! INTRODUCTION
By restricting their Judgement to apply to combatants only, Judges McDonald and Vohrah 
are setting a higher standard of behaviour for combatants to adhere to in a situation of 
duress, than that which they expect from a civilian.  They are effectively  taking a ´broad 
brush´ approach, in that they find that combatants, as a group, cannot plead the defence, 
no matter what the particular circumstances of their case are.  Such circumstances must 
instead be pled in mitigation.  What are the consequences which flow from this? 
4.2! ! IS A CIVILIAN´S LIFE WORTH MORE THAN A COMBATANT´S? 
According to the Judgement, a combatant who is forced at gun point to murder innocents 
must, in order to avoid criminal responsibility, refuse, and sacrifice himself; whereas, a 
civilian in exactly the same situation, may potentially rely  on the defence of duress.  This 
implies that the civilian´s life is worth protecting, when the combatants is not.  The law is 
potentially willing to excuse or justify256 the civilian for killing, but not the combatant.  The 
Judges´ argument is that, because of his job, the combatant must have at least have 
expected a violent end, and must therefore be prepared to die.  
Is it possible to find justification in IHL or HRL for such a distinction between the “value” 
placed on the life of a civilian and the “value” placed on the life of a combatant?
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4.2.1! ! International Humanitarian Law
Firstly let us turn to IHL.  
In an IAC, a solider has the right to directly participate in hostilities,257  and consequently 
becomes a legitimate target for enemy combatants himself.  The law accepts that he may 
be killed during the course of the armed conflict by an enemy combatant, without that 
enemy combatant acquiring criminal responsibility for the killing.258  However, as has been 
examined above259, if a combatant is hors de combat, he becomes a protected person 
under the Conventions, and is no longer a lawful target.  An enemy combatant who kills a 
combatant in these circumstances commits a war crime.260
If a combatant is killed by any one other than an enemy combatant, then the killer may 
incur criminal responsibility for the killing.261   If a civilian becomes directly involved in 
hostilities, and kills a combatant, then that civilian may be held criminally liable, providing 
that they  have no defence.262   Alternatively, if a combatant is killed by another combatant, 
who is not an enemy combatant, then the non-enemy combatant may be criminally liable, 
again providing he has no defence.263 
There are therefore several situations where the law protects the life of a combatant, or 
where IHl and/or ICL, provide that the death of a combatant is unlawful.
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263  See for example http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/oct/24/friendly-fire-sniper-could-face-manslaughter-
charge.  In such situations, IHL does not apply, rather it will be the domestic law of the states concerned or 
international criminal law.
As was discussed in Chapter 2,264  civilians enjoy  general protection against the dangers 
arising from military operations.265  They are not to be made the object of attack.266   The 
reality of war, however, is that innocent civilians are killed.  IHL accepts this fact, and 
allows for civilian deaths, without the killers incurring criminal responsibility for the deaths, 
provided that the deaths occur according to specified rules.267  Civilians who take a direct 
part in hostilities lose the protection afforded by Chapter II of API, and become legitimate 
targets for such time as they take a direct part.268  
As was discussed in Chapter 3, the situation in a NIAC is less clear.  There are no treaty 
provisions giving combatants the right to directly  participate in hostilities.  It is unclear 
under international law, whether combatants or civilians can be killed legally.   Both CA 3 
and AP II extend protections to those who are not taking an active part in hostilities, and 
therefore apply equally to both civilians, and to combatants who are hors de combat. 
IHL does therefore attach different “values” to combatant and civilian lives.  However this 
changes if a combatant is captured, sick, wounded or surrenders.  If that happens, the 
“value” of his life arguably becomes equal to that of a civilian´s, for once he becomes a 
protected person under the Conventions, attacks against him are unlawful.  He cannot be 
made the object of attack, in the same way as a civilian cannot be made the object of 
attack.269  In addition, attacks against him by persons other than enemy combatants, such 
as civilians taking a direct part in hostilities, may be deemed unlawful at any  time during 
hostilities.  
4.2.2! ! Human Rights Law
As was examined in Chapter 3, during an armed conflict, a State may derogate from some 
human rights.  In respect of the right to life, this is only permitted in so far as is allowed by 
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IHL.270  With regard to both civilians and combatants, the duty to protect their right to life 
only endures whilst they are within the jurisdiction of the State.  The precise extent of a 
State´s duty to protect the human rights of its combatants during an armed conflict is 
unclear, but must be viewed through the prism of military life.271 
In peacetime, the State owes both combatants and civilians a duty  to ensure that their right 
to life is not infringed, although, again, where combatants are concerned, account is to be 
taken of the peculiarities of military life.272  In peacetime this is likely to include the inherent 
perils involved in the training of combatants and the regular use of dangerous weapons.
Therefore, it can also be said that HRL does differentiate between the “value” of a 
combatant´s life and that of a civilian´s.  The combatant´s right to life is always to be 
viewed within the context of military  life.  This will normally  mean that he can be expected 
to endure harsher conditions than that which a civilian should be expected to endure.273 
4.2.3! ! Conclusion
IHL and HRL do value the life of a combatant differently from that of a civilian at times.  In 
IHL, combatants are lawful targets, but then, so are civilians, providing that they are killed 
in accordance with IHL.  In an IAC, combatants, in contrast to civilians, can be directly 
targeted by enemy combatants, and their lives can therefore be described as being “worth 
less” than civilians´.  However, if they become hors de combat, for whatever reason, their 
lives are arguably  “worth” the same as a civilians.  As soon as a civilian takes a direct part 
in hostilities, then they lose their civilian protection and they too become lawful targets.274   
In HRL, the obligation to protect a combatant´s right to life must always be viewed in the 
context of military life.  A State could be found to have infringed a civilian´s right to life, but 
not to have infringed a combatant´s in the same circumstances.
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However, even though there is a distinction, in both IHL and HRL, between the value of 
combatant and civilian lives, neither take a “broad brush” approach, as Judges McDonald 
and Vohrah do, to the value of a combatant´s life.  In both IHL and HRL, the status of the 
combatant at a certain moment in time, or the particular circumstances of a combatant at 
that time, are the important factors in determining the rights and protections the law 
accords to a combatant.   
4.3! ! IS IT JUST TO TREAT ALL COMBATANTS IN THE SAME WAY?
A further difficulty with the Judgement, is whether it is just to treat all combatants in the 
same way.  The finding that all combatants are unable to rely on the defence of duress, 
means that no account can be taken of the particular circumstances of that combatant until 
he has been found guilty, when they can be looked at in mitigation.  
A person can become a combatant for different reasons and through different means. 
They may volunteer to be a combatant, or they may be forced to join through conscription; 
in extreme cases, people can be abducted and forced to join an army.275   Some States 
provide thorough training, including education in IHL.  In others training can be limited or 
non existent.  Can a well trained volunteer be expected to react in the same way to a 
situation of duress as a reluctant, ill trained conscript?  
What about combatants of different ranks - should a low ranking, inexperienced soldier be 
expected to react in the same way as a well educated, commissioned officer, with many 
years experience?  
What about child soldiers?  Although States are under an obligation to take all feasible 
measures to ensure that children do not take a direct part in hostilities, and are to refrain 
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from recruiting children,276 children continue to take on combatant roles in many countries. 
Can they be expected to react to duress in the same way as an adult combatant?  
Should the law treat combatants from such different backgrounds in the same way?  Is it 
just for the law to deny the defence of duress to all of them simply  because they are 
combatants?  Surely this results in the law being unreasonable and inflexible? 
The Judges would argue that the exact circumstances of a particular combatant can be 
taken into account in mitigation of his sentence.277   It is at that stage, once the combatant 
has pled guilty to the crime, that factors such as the age of the combatant, his education, 
his training and his experience, can be examined by the court and can be used to 
determine a fair sentence.  However, as Cassese argues in his Judgement,278  this still 
results in the individual being found guilty of a criminal act, no matter what sentence he is 
given.  Even if the court finds that the circumstances were such that no punishment is 
justified, the effect of a criminal conviction is that society is labeling the conduct as 
unacceptable.  A criminal conviction can have many consequences: affecting employment 
prospects; and whether a person can get a visa to visit a foreign country,279 in addition to 
the purely psychological impact.  
4.4! ! SHOULD CIVILIANS WHO TAKE A DIRECT PART IN HOSTILITIES BE 
! ! TREATED MORE LENIENTLY THAN COMBATANTS?
A further consequence of the Judgement is that it means that civilians who are taking a 
direct part in hostilities may be able to rely on a defence of duress when a combatant 
could not.   
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As previously touched upon, there is debate about what constitutes directly participating 
in hostilities.280  The ICRC advise that fighters who are not members of the armed forces 
of a State, and are not therefore combatants,281  but have a continuous combat function, 
lose their protection as a civilian against attack for the duration of the time that they  have 
such a function.282   Could the Judgement be extended to include such fighters within the 
definition of a combatant?   If so, on what basis would this be done?   
The Judge´s argument is that combatants are to be treated differently, because they 
should be braver than civilians, and more expectant of a violent death by virtue of the job 
they do.  Is this also true of other kinds of fighters who do not qualify as combatants?  
A combatant should have had military training and training in the laws of war and 
international law.283  A  member of an organised armed group may well have had no such 
training.284   On this basis, perhaps a fighter should be treated as a civilian and entitled to 
rely on the defence of duress.  However, if this is the case, what message does it send out 
to combatants, that a member of, for example, the Taliban, can plead the defence when 
they can not?
4.5! WHAT OPTIONS ARE AVAILABLE TO A COMBATANT IF HE IS 
! INVOLVED IN A CONFLICT WHERE INTERNATIONAL CRIMES ARE 
! OCCURRING?
Bailliet285  argues that denying the defence of duress to combatants requires that a 
combatant must ensure that they are never placed in a situation of duress during 
humanitarian violations, and that the best way for them to do this is by way  of desertion or 
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draft evasion.  She argues that States must therefore provide protection within their 
asylum policies to those combatants who flee from such situations.  
 
However, for some combatants, particularly those who have been forced to join, desertion 
or draft evasion may not be a realistic option,286  meaning that in a situation of duress, to 
act lawfully, the Erdemović decision requires them to sacrifice themselves.
4.6! ! CONCLUSION
There are clearly  some important consequences which flow from restricting the decision in 
Erdemović to combatants only. 
Firstly, it infers that combatants´ lives are not worth as much as civilians´, which is not 
necessarily the case in IHL or HRL.  Secondly, it infers that members of armed groups, 
whose status in an armed conflict is that of civilians taking a direct part in hostilities, may 
be able to plead duress when a combatant could not.  Finally, requiring all combatants to 
adhere to one standard of behaviour is unrealistic, and fails to take into account the many 
different ways that a person can become a combatant, and the particular circumstances of 
a combatant.  This can be taken account of in mitigation, but this still results in a criminal 
conviction for the combatant, which may be unjust and unreasonable in the circumstances 
of the case.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
Let us return to Drazen Erdemović, standing in a field at the farm that day.  He has been 
ordered to shoot unarmed, innocent civilians - unquestionably a war crime.  He has been 
offered a choice by his superior officer - to obey the order, and become a war criminal; or 
to disobey, and lose his life in a futile gesture, which will make no difference to the civilians 
he has been ordered to kill, who will be killed anyway.  
Judges McDonald and Vohrah argue that, as a combatant he must have envisaged the 
possibility of violent death in pursuance of the cause for which he fights.287  However, as 
has been shown, the circumstances where he may be legally  killed are not unlimited. 
There are many international laws protecting his life.  
It is impossible to imagine what it would be like to be placed in Erdemović´s shoes that 
day.  Is it a scenario that a combatant could possibly be trained for? When Erdemović 
volunteered to be a soldier, he may well have imagined that he would lose his life while 
doing his job, however, it is unlikely that he envisaged that he would be ordered to commit 
a war crime, with the alternative of being shot by his fellow soldiers if he failed to comply. 
The circumstances that Erdemović found himself in were far from the normal demands of 
military service.  Despite this, in order to remain within the confines of the law, the 
Judgement requires him to go beyond his normal duty, including his duty to die fighting for 
his country, and sacrifice himself.  
Certainly, we may hope, as the Judges do, that an individual combatant will chose to 
sacrifice himself rather than kill innocents, but ultimately, he is a human being.  In such an 
incomprehensible situation, there is no compelling reason why all combatants should be 
legally required to sacrifice themselves, particularly where the innocent victims will be 
killed anyway, regardless of what they do.  
We cannot expect all combatants to become heros or martyrs in circumstances as 
extreme as those which arose in this case. As Cassese argues:
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“Law is based on what society  can reasonably expect of its members.  It should 
not set intractable standards of behaviour which require mankind to perform 
acts of martyrdom, and brand as criminal any behaviour falling below these 
standards.”288
Instead a court must be allowed to examine all of the facts of a case to determine whether 
the defence of duress can be made out.  If a court is able to consider all the variables, 
such as age, rank, education and training of an accused combatant, it will surely reach a 
more just and reasoned decision, than a court which has its hands tied as the Erdemović 
decision requires.  The Judges´ argument that such factors can be considered in mitigation 
are unsatisfactory, as it would involve finding that the accused was guilty of the crime.  
The definition of duress contained in Article 31(d) of the Rome Statute makes no 
distinction between civilians and combatants.  Instead it is more in accordance with the 
proportionality test argued for by Cassese in Erdemović.289  It requires that, for a person to 
avoid criminal responsibility by reason of duress, they must commit the act necessarily and 
reasonably, in order to avoid a threat of imminent death, or of continuing, or imminent 
serious bodily harm against that person, or another person.  The person must not intend to 
cause any greater harm than the one to be avoided.  This is surely a better solution, rather 
than requiring all combatants to adhere to one standard.  
To require all combatants to behave as heros in circumstances which have descended 
from ´normal´ warfare which they were trained for, into horror, is unrealistic and unjust.  In 
such cases, combatants should be permitted to argue duress as a defence, with their 
combatant status being one factor to be considered, for, at the end of the day, as Robert 
Burns so aptly wrote, “A man´s a man for a´ that”:290 we are all only human.
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